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Abstract 
7 
8 
There is increasing interest in the use of economic valuation of ecosystem goods and services for a 
9 
wide variety of purposes. These include relatively familiar uses in project appraisal and more novel 
11 applications in advocacy, performance tracking and accounting in public and private settings. 
12 Decision makers who may make use of or who are exposed to valuation information need to 
13 understand the background, strengths and weaknesses of these approaches to assessing environmental 
14 changes. The methods have a strong history in economic theory and offer a rapidly growing evidence 
16 base and improving ability to evaluate a broad range of ecosystem goods and services. Nevertheless, 
17 there are theoretical and practical limitations that need to be understood and kept in mind when 
18 interpreting results. In this paper, we briefly review the economic valuation methods and situate them 
19 in their historical and theoretical contexts. We assess the main critiques, attempts at resolving them, 
20 and implications for the appropriateness of the methods in different contexts. We examine the main 
22 barriers and opportunities for wider uses of valuation evidence and draw conclusions on the 
23 appropriate role of valuation going forward: as an important tool for aiding reflection and deliberation 
24 processes alongside a broader range of considerations. 
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1 Introduction 
7 
8 
Market systems and economic appraisal methods offer powerful tools for supporting decisions 
10 about the allocation of scarce resources across competing ends. However there are many 
11 
12 important aspects of human activity that are not fully reflected in market prices, including 
13 human impacts and dependence on the many valuable goods and services provided by 
15 
ecosystems. With the aim of improving decision making processes, there is increasing 
16 
17 interest in economic valuation of ecosystem goods and services (hereafter referred to as 
18 
19 economic valuation) from research providers, policy makers and private sector decision 
20 makers. 
22 
23 
A short paper (Ozdemiroglu and Hails, 2016) was drafted using contributions from 
25 120 research providers and users to answer frequently asked questions about economic 
26 
27 valuation. At the same time, a longer review of the concepts and practice was prepared by a 
28 subset of those contributors. 
30 
31 
This article is based on that longer review, and is written for a general audience with 
33 basic knowledge about economic valuation. It presents a summary of the conceptual 
34 
35 background and history of economic valuation; an assessment of current methods; a 
36 
37 discussion of practical applications; a critique of key uncertainties and assumptions; and 
38 concludes with consideration of barriers and opportunities for future developments and uses. 
39 
40 
41 2 Conceptual background to economic valuation and its history 
42 
43 
44 Economic valuation has a long history (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010) with roots in 
45 
46 Pre-classical economics (1650-1750), when ‘land’ was central to economic theory as a 
47 primary source of wealth (Petty, 1664). During Classical economics (1750-1875), the 
49 importance of nature’s services was widely recognised (Malthus, 1853, Marx, 1887), although 
50 
51 ecology did not exist as a discipline until the late 1800s, and the ‘ecosystem’ concept was 
52 
53 introduced by Tansley (1935). Following the industrial revolution, the significance of the 
54 environment waned in Neoclassical economic theory (1875 onwards) with attention focused 
56 on human-made capital and labour. 
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2 
3 The 20th century saw renewed interest in the environmental impacts of economic 
4 
5 activity, and in the dependence of the economy, and human welfare, on healthy natural 
6 systems. Pigou (1920) introduced the concept of externality and welfare economics, leading 
8 
to the development of environmental economics and the foundations of economic valuation 
9 
10 (notably Hicks, 1939, 1943; Hotelling, 1947; see Pearce, 2002). 
11 
12 
13 The first important applications came in the 1960s with valuation of environmental 
14 
15 resources underpinning new legislation in the USA, in particular the Clean Air (1963) and 
16 Clean Waters (1972) Acts. Early examples of the methods included Clawson (1959), Davis 
18 (1963), Clawson and Knetsch (1966) and Ridker (1967). The development and application of 
19 
20 economic valuation continued through the 1970s and 1980s, with progress in the move from 
21 zonal to individual travel cost models (Brown and Nawas, 1973, Gum and Martin 1974), and 
23 development of Contingent Valuation (e.g. Randall et al., 1974) leading eventually to its 
24 
25 adoption in the USA as a means of estimating damages to environmental resources 
26 
27 (Cummings et al., 1986, Mitchell and Carson, 1989). In the UK, ‘Blueprint for a Green 
28 Economy’ (Pearce et al., 1989) and the following White Paper (‘This Common Inheritance’: 
30 HMSO, 1990) sought formal inclusion of environmental impacts in policy appraisal. 
31 
32 
33 The 1990s brought continued refinement of valuation methods, for example through 
34 
35 the introduction of discrete choice experiments and random utility models in stated and 
36 revealed preference studies (Adamowicz et al., 1994, Boxall et al., 1996, Hanley et al., 1998). 
38 Nordhaus (1992, 1993) pioneered integrated assessment models linking the global economy, 
39 
40 energy use and climate change, estimating the value of damage caused by greenhouse gases. 
41 
42 
43 Alongside the development of environmental economics, dissenting voices (Boulding, 
44 1966, Meadows et al, 1972, Daly, 1973) led to the emergence of ecological economics, 
46 
treating the economy as a subsystem of the global ecosystem, with a greater focus on systemic 
47 
48 approaches to the preservation of natural capital, justice and equity, and issues of 
49 
50 irreversibility and uncertainty (van den Bergh, 2001; Faber, 2008). “Doughnut economics” 
51 (Raworth, 2018) crystalizes many of these ideas, for example rejecting the focus on GDP 
53 growth and promoting ideas of circular economy and reducing inequality as key objectives. 
54 
55 
56 Ecological and environmental economics remain in some ways separate approaches 
57 
58 (Illge and Schwarze, 2006), though with considerable overlap in terms of both approaches and 
59 practitioners. For valuation, the methods have been largely the same; with the differences 
1 
2 
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3 being in how values are combined and used to support decision making. Recent work on 
4 
5 valuation methods in ecological economics (Irvine et al., 2016; Kenter et al., 2015) has sought 
6 to distance itself from neoclassical approaches principally by suggesting that many 
8 
environmental values are social and shared, as opposed to being associated with individual 
9 
10 utility, and are thus formed in response to specific situations rather than being elicited from 
11 
12 individuals. 
13 
14 
15 Costanza et al. (1997) combined environmental economics with an ecosystem services 
16 framework to ‘value’ the world’s ecosystem services at US$33 trillion per year. The 
18 Costanza study was theoretically flawed1 in seeking a total value for the ecosystems on which 
19 
20 all life depends (Fisher et al., 2009 described it as “a serious underestimate of infinity”) but 
21 successfully raised awareness of the ecosystem services paradigm and non-market valuation, 
23 shifting them into mainstream debate. 
24 
25 
26 Ongoing loss of biodiversity and ecosystems was highlighted in studies such as the 
27 
28 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005) and various National Ecosystem 
29 
30 Assessments (including those in the UK, UKNEA, 2011 and 2014), with a direct link being 
31 made to economic losses and decline in human wellbeing. The Economics of Ecosystems and 
32 
33 Biodiversity (TEEB)2 has played a global role in “making nature’s values visible”, while the 
34 
35 European Environment Agency (EEA) has led work to develop the Common International 
36 Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES)3 and the US Environment Protection Agency 
38 (EPA) has developed the Final Ecosystem Goods and Services Classification System (FEGS- 
39 
40 CS)4. The European Commission supported TEEB via several projects, including the Cost of 
41 
42 Policy Inaction study (Braat and ten Brink, 2008) which gave a conservative and partial 
43 estimate that the global cost of additional biodiversity loss after 2000 would reach 7% of 
45 world GDP by 2050. Economic valuation of biodiversity is notoriously difficult and prone to 
46 
47 leading to unintended interpretations and undervaluing. Therefore, it is particularly important 
48 
49    
50 
51 1 Despite the flaws, the study remains useful, both as an awareness-raising exercise, and through setting a 
52 
53 baseline for comparisons using consistent methods: a follow up (Costanza et al, 2014) updated the unit values 
54 and took account of land use/land cover change from 1997-2011, showing a higher total value (due to 
55 
56 revaluation) but a substantial loss due to land use change. There was also a review by Costanza et al (2017). 
57 
2
 http://www.teebweb.org/ 
58 
3
 http://cices.eu/ 
60 4 https://www.epa.gov/eco-research/final-ecosystem-goods-and-services-classification-system-fegs-cs 
1 
2 
3 in the case of biodiversity that both qualitative and quantitative narrative is presented as well 
4 
5 as what is possible to express in monetary valuation. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
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6 Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) was set up in 2012 to assess the 
8 
state of biodiversity and of the ecosystem services it provides to society, in response to 
9 
10 requests from decision makers5. 
11 
12 
13 The numbers of papers and projects using ecosystem services have risen dramatically 
14 
15 and the concept is now ingrained in policy across the world. A growing number of original 
16 economic valuation studies, meta-analyses of economic valuation studies (e.g. Brouwer et al., 
18 1999; Brander et al., 2011) and economic valuation databases6 has consolidated the evidence 
19 
20 base and facilitated the transfer of economic value estimates to new contexts (such transfer 
21 being considered contentious by some: see e.g. Ravenscroft, 2019). The mainstreaming of 
23 economic valuation is demonstrated by the development under the environmental 
24 
25 management systems series International Standards Organisation (ISO) 14000 (the best- 
26 
27 selling standard in the world) of ISO 14007 “Environmental management: Determining 
28 environmental costs and benefits – Guidance”7 and ISO 140088 “Monetary valuation of 
30 environmental impacts and related environmental aspects”. 
31 
32 
33 2.1 The concept of value in neoclassical economics 
34 
35 
36 In neoclassical economics, “value” is grounded in utilitarianism, an ethical theory 
37 
38 traced back to Hume (1751) and Bentham (1789) and with roots in the Greek Hedonist 
39 philosophers. Utilitarianism holds that the best moral action is the one that maximizes utility. 
41 Utility in turn can be variously defined, but is generally related to the well-being of sentient 
42 
43 entities. In neoclassical economics, only anthropocentric values (including passive and non- 
44 use values) are taken into account. Non-anthropocentric and intrinsic values, for which we 
46 
have no assessment methods, are excluded, though they may be acknowledged as boundaries 
47 
48 on economic valuation with respect to our obligations to other beings and objects. 
49 
50 
51 
52 5 www.ipbes.net/about 
53 6 See in particular the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI) (www.evri.ca), the TEEB valuation 
54 database (http://es-partnership.org/services/data-knowledge-sharing/ecosystem-service-valuation-database/; de 
55 
56 Groot et al., 2012), the Envalue database (http://marineecosystemservices.org/explore) and the Marine 
57 Ecosystem Services Partnership’s (MESP) Valuation Library (http://marineecosystemservices.org/explore). 
58 
7
 https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc207sc1/home/projects/ongoing/iso-14007.html 
60 8 https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc207sc1/home/projects/ongoing/iso-14008.html 
1 
2 
3 Human utility is assessed using the framework of expected utility theory (von 
4 
5 Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) following the assumption that individuals act as ‘rational 
6 utility maximisers’ whose decisions and behaviour stem from preferences accurately 
8 
reflecting their utilities. Related values are reflected through individual choices under a 
9 
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10 budget constraint, expressed as ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) to secure a gain or avoid a loss, or 
11 
12 ‘willingness to accept’ (WTA) compensation to forgo a gain or tolerate a loss. 
13 
14 
15 Although based on individuals’ preferences, the Total Economic Value (TEV) 
16 framework (Figure 1) is not limited to ‘selfish’ values. In addition to values for their own 
18 direct and indirect uses of goods and services, people often have altruistic preferences for 
19 
20 others, for future generations (bequest value) and for aspects of the natural world in their own 
21 right (existence value). These “non-use values” are expressed, for example, via charitable 
23 donations. The framework was recently extended by Pascual et al., (2015) to include 
24 
25 ‘insurance’ values, related to uncertainty about outcomes and preferences, and associated 
26 
27 willingness to pay to mitigate risks, to adapt to risks, or to preserve options to use resources if 
28 circumstances change. 
30 
31 
[Figure 1 about here] 
32 
33 
34 2.2 Values in markets 
35 
36 
37 The use of money and markets allows huge efficiency gains compared with systems of barter 
38 
39 or directed activities. Individuals express their preferences via market demands for goods and 
40 services and their supply of labour and assets, while firms express values through demand for 
42 
resources and labour and supply of goods and services. A well-functioning market enables 
43 
44 mutually beneficial trades and the market ‘clears’ at a price at which all people willing to 
45 
46 trade at that price can do so, maximising the economic surplus produced. 
47 
48 
49 ‘General equilibrium’ (Walras, 1877) implies simultaneous clearing of all markets, 
50 such that the prices in each market represent the opportunity costs
9 of the resources used to 
52 produce the good or service. Through adjustments of prices in response to supply and 
53 
54 demand, a full set of perfectly functioning markets would achieve efficient allocation of 
55 
56    
57 
58 
9 Opportunity cost is the value in ‘next best use’, e.g. switching the resource from production of good A to good 
60 B. 
1 
2 
3 scarce resources, maximising economic surplus, and achieving a ‘Pareto optimum’ in which it 
4 
5 is not possible to make any person better off without making someone worse off (Pareto, 
6 1906). There are many possible Pareto optimal equilibria and which one ‘perfect” markets 
8 
would in theory reach depends on the initial distribution of ‘endowments’ (property rights). 
9 
10 The social choice among them is a normative matter of ‘fairness’. 
11 
12 
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14 
13 At the societal level, taxation and redistribution policies can be used to improve 
14 
15 fairness (see e.g. Hochman and Rodgers, 1969, Stiglitz, 1987). Individual economic 
16 appraisals generally apply the Kaldor-Hicks rule (Hicks, 1939, Kaldor, 1939) that a change is 
18 beneficial if the ‘winners’ could fully compensate the ‘losers’ and still be better off. But with 
19 
20 no actual compensation, in practice appraisals allow gains to some people to offset losses to 
21 others. 
23 
24 
In reality, while market prices guide individual choices, various ‘market failures’ (see 
26 Bator, 1958) mean they do not always reflect social values, resulting in (Pareto-)inefficient 
27 
28 outcomes. Some important failures include those presented in Table 1. 
29 
30 
31 Table 1: Market failures: description, example and possible solutions 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 For ecosystem goods and services, the main market failure is often externality, driving 
55 
56 a wedge between market outcomes and socially desirable outcomes, because many ecosystem 
57 goods and services that benefit people are not traded in markets. Policies may address such 
59 failures in various ways such as changing prices (taxes, subsidies), controlling quantities 
1 
2 
3 (quotas, permits) or restricting activities and technologies and activities (regulations, bans). 
4 
5 To support policies, and for appraisal (notably cost benefit analysis), one potentially useful 
6 option is to estimate economic values for non-market goods and services in monetary units. 
8 
Economic valuation methods seek to extend the scope of economic analysis to consider all the 
9 
10 consequences of decisions that enter utility and production functions, not only those that are 
11 
12 traded in markets, allowing comparisons of relative values across impacts, people, time, and 
13 decisions. 
Failure Description Example Possible solutions 
Distortionary 
taxes 
Taxes/subsidies influence 
incentives 
Fossil fuel 
subsidies 
Remove 
Externality / 
missing markets 
Impacts of activities not 
fully considered by actors 
Pollution 
Open access 
Taxes, quotas, standards; 
Clarify property rights 
Imperfect 
competition 
Market power allows price 
manipulation 
OPEC raising 
oil prices 
Antitrust regulations 
Imperfect 
information 
Choices do not reflect 
values 
Asbestos, 
DDT, 
ecosystem 
tipping points 
Research and education, 
precautionary principle 
Labelling, regulations 
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3 Economic valuation methods 
18 
19 Values for goods and services traded in markets are generally estimated through observed 
20 
21 prices, or sometimes econometric estimation of demand curves for non-marginal changes. 
22 
23 Where there is market failure, prices can be adjusted or estimated to derive measures of social 
24 benefits and costs. 
26 
27 
Where a non-market good is closely related to a market one, proxy values may be 
28 
29 identified. For example, home-grown or gathered food can be valued using market prices for 
30 
31 equivalent produce. Sometimes, statistical analysis can derive ‘production functions’ relating 
32 changes in some ecosystem function to production of a good or service that can be valued 
34 (Barbier, 2007). For example, production functions relating air pollution to crop yields 
35 
36 (market values) and human health (non-market values) estimate air pollution damages in 
37 
38 mainland China at 5.7-6.6% of GDP (Miao et al, 2017). The primary difficulty is the 
39 availability of scientific knowledge and/or data for estimating the production function. 
41 
42 
Where market values cannot be used or adjusted, there are two main approaches to 
43 
44 valuation: revealed preference and stated preference. 
45 
46 
47 3.1 Revealed preference 
48 
49 
50 Revealed preference methods analyse relationships between demand for some market goods 
51 and preferences for related non-market goods/services. These methods only work if changes 
53 in provision of the non-market good have an observable impact on the demand for a market 
54 
55 good. Examples include property and labour markets (hedonic methods), demand for 
56 
57 recreation (travel cost), and demand for products that compensate for losses in environmental 
58 services (averting behaviour). 
60 
1 
2 
3 Averting behaviour approaches involve estimating household ‘production functions’ 
4 
5 that allow derivation of values for risks and disamenities via the expenditures households 
6 incur to avoid them - for example to avoid exposure to pollution (Bartik, 1988) or risks 
8 
associated with groundwater contamination (Abdalla et al., 1992).  Problems include for 
9 
10 example joint impacts (e.g. double glazing will impact both noise and thermal comfort), 
11 
12 ‘lumpiness’ in investments and transactions costs (see Courant and Porter, 1981) and 
13 imperfect information about risks, effectiveness of measures, and the endogeneity of risk 
15 perceptions (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2018). 
16 
17 
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18 Hedonic pricing has a similar theoretical background (Rosen, 1974). Common 
19 
20 applications seek to value environmental quality aspects of housing via statistical analysis of 
21 property markets (see Boyle and Kiel, 2001). Sale/rental values of properties are modelled as 
23 a function of property “attributes” including environmental quality (such as noise nuisance 
24 
25 (Day et al., 2007), air pollution (Smith and Huang, 1993), or proximity to desirable features, 
26 
27 such as an urban green space (Czembrowski and Kronenberg, 2016) or undesirable features 
28 such as landfill sites (Hite et al., 2001)). The method only accounts for use values associated 
30 with occupation of the property and does not cover values to non-residents. The method 
31 
32 assumes markets are perfectly functioning, though people may have poor knowledge 
33 
34 regarding both the levels and the impacts of some attributes (e.g. air pollution), and housing 
35 markets generally have high transactions costs (taxes and moving costs) and may therefore 
36 
37 respond slowly to changed conditions (Freeman, 1981). Hedonic wage methods use a similar 
38 
39 approach to value risks to health/life, via the wage premium for dangerous jobs (Liu et al., 
40 
1997). 
42 
43 
Travel cost methods use costs incurred travelling to and at a site, including the cost of 
45 time, as a proxy for the price of recreation. This is combined with information about visit 
46 
47 rates to derive an estimate of the value of recreation at the site. The main methodological 
48 concerns include the valuation of travel time (Bockstael et al., 1987), the analysis of multi-site 
50 
and multi-purpose trips, and accounting for substitute sites and activities (Ward and Beal 
51 
52 2000). Early applications focused on single sites, but modern methods use Random Utility 
53 
54 models (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005) focusing on individuals’ choices from a set of alternative 
55 sites, modelled as a function of site characteristics and individual factors including income 
57 and travel costs. 
58 
59 
1 
2 
3 3.2 Stated preference 
4 
5 
6 Stated preference methods are based on surveys which create hypothetical markets for 
7 
8 respondents to express their preferences. One advantage of stated preference (over revealed 
9 preference) methods is that they are suitable to elicit preferences in scenarios that are yet to 
11 occur, therefore providing ex-ante information on expected WTP to inform the design of 
12 
13 future policies.10 
14 
15 
16  Contingent valuation (CV) asks directly how much respondents are willing to pay to 
17 
18 secure the change presented, or willing to accept compensation to avoid it
11, via open- 
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22 
19 ended questions or different forms of bidding formats. 
20 
21  Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are based on respondents’ choices for their 
22 
23 preferred scenario among alternatives. Scenarios are described by different 
24 combinations of the goods and services in terms of their environmental as well as cost 
26 
attributes, each taking different levels in each scenario. Information on the values that 
27 
28 people assign to improvements in the different goods and services are indirectly 
29 
30 inferred from the trade-offs that people are willing to make when choosing their 
31 preferred alternatives. 
33 
34 
Both CV and DCE formats enable estimation of WTP (or WTA) for the good or service as 
36 a whole; DCE also allows for the calculation of implicit prices of specific attributes. 
37 
38 
39 Responses in stated preference surveys may show high sensitivity to factors that 
40 
41 should not matter (according to economic theory) and/or insensitivity to factors that should. 
42 Examples of the former are starting-point/anchoring/range biases (Chien et al., 2005, Whynes 
44 et al., 2004), where the amount(s) proposed as WTP options in the survey influences the 
45 
46 responses, and order effects, where the order in which components of the good are valued 
47 
48 affects overall stated value (Day et al., 2012, Powe and Bateman, 2003). Examples of the 
49 latter are the failure of the valuation to vary with the scope or quantity of the good (e.g. Powe 
50 
51 and Bateman, 2004, Veisten et al., 2004). Critics argue that hypothetical questions generate 
52 
53 hypothetical, invalid responses (Hausman, 2012) and WTP from surveys often exceeds WTP 
54 
55 
56 
57 10 Recent reviews of the CV and DCE include Venkatachalam (2004), Hoyos (2010), Kling et al. (2012) and 
58 Johnston et al. (2017). 
60 11 Rare in practice since the framing of compensation for accepting damages tends to trigger protest responses. 
1 
2 
3 with real payments (Little and Berrens, 2004, Fifer et al., 2014). Respondents may have 
4 
5 strategic motives to misreport WTP, to make a ‘protest’ bid (false zero or inflated WTP) or to 
6 refuse to express preference, not because they are indifferent, but because they reject the 
8 
valuation scenario, the implied property right, or the valuation approach (Jorgensen et al., 
9 
10 1999, Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2010). Substantial research has helped develop strategies to limit 
11 
12 these potential biases through careful study design and testing (Carson and Groves, 2007, 
13 Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006, Cummings and Taylor, 1999, Atkinson et al., 2012). 
15 
16 
Stated preference methods can assess the WTP for an environmental improvement or 
18 the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for deterioration. WTA can be greater than 
19 
20 WTP for an equivalent change due to income effects, but in empirical studies this discrepancy 
21 tends to be greater than theory predicts (Brown and Gregory, 1999, Horowitz and McConnell, 
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23 2002). Behavioural explanations such as an endowment effect or loss aversion (Tversky and 
24 
25 Kahneman, 1991) and ambiguity of the transaction and expected regret (Loomes and Sugden, 
26 
27 1982) have been proposed. None of these concepts have sufficiently explained the differences 
28 observed in empirical studies. The difficulties of deriving unbiased estimates of WTA mean 
30 that WTP is almost always used, though this underestimates WTA and remains controversial. 
31 
32 
33 4 Valuation in practice 
34 
35 
36 There are many applications for valuation evidence that may call for different methods, 
37 
38 coverage, accuracy and research expenditure, and may evoke different ethical and practical 
39 objections (see e.g. Beaumont et al., 2018, Gómez-Baggethun and Barton, 2013, Laurans et 
41 al., 2013). The article by Curnow in this special issue (2019) is a current summary of the use 
42 
43 of economic evidence in environmental policy by the UK government. In general, 
44 applications include: 
46 
47 
 Demonstrating economic value, advocacy 
49 
 Project/policy appraisal, impact assessment 
50 
51  Prioritising investments 
52 
53  Demonstrating ‘Value for Money’, seeking funding 
54 
55  Planning/location decisions 
56  Monitoring/review of decisions 
58  Environmental accounting 
59 
60  Pricing decisions: fees, payments, compensation 
1 
2 
3 For most practical purposes, value transfer is used to draw values from other studies to 
4 
5 use as proxies in the analysis. This is cheaper and quicker than conducting original studies. 
6 The simplest type, unit transfer, directly applies an estimate of value made for one site or 
8 
location to another. A more sophisticated approach uses a value function describing the 
9 
10 relationship between value and key environmental and population factors influencing it. 
11 
12 Meta-analysis can be used to estimate a composite value function based on several studies. 
13 Value estimates based on careful meta-analysis of several good-quality studies may produce 
15 narrower confidence intervals than a single study, provided the meta-analysis take sufficient 
16 
17 account of socioeconomic and biophysical heterogeneity (Schmidt et al., 2016). 
18 
19 
20 The most familiar and widespread application is project appraisal using cost-benefit 
21 analysis (CBA) (see Boardman et al., 2017, OECD, 2018). CBA compares all the benefits 
23 and costs of project/policy options that can be valued in monetary terms. These are 
24 
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25 discounted to convert future values to present-day equivalents, then aggregated to give 
26 
27 expected net present value assuming calculable risks about future flows value (other statistical 
28 treatments are also possible). CBA can compare options for a specific decision, and 
30 rank/prioritise spending options in terms of their net present value, benefit: cost ratio, or 
31 
32 internal rate of return. 
33 
34 
35 Discounting can be justified through social time-preference (people value benefits 
36 now more than benefits later) and/or returns to investment (projects should bring greater 
38 social return than alternative uses for funds) (see HMT, 2018). The choice of discount rate is 
39 
40 hard to justify objectively (Arrow et al., 2012) but has great influence over results (Weitzman, 
41 
42 2007). This is why national governments and international institutions typically have a 
43 standard measure (European Commission, 2015; HMT, 2018). Some argue that discounting 
45 is inappropriate for long-term, significant environmental changes (Stern, Peters et al., 2006, 
46 
47 Saez and Requena, 2007, Stern and Taylor, 2007, Faccioli, Hanley et al., 2016) because 
48 standard discount rates of a few percent result in huge discounting of long-term impacts – 
50 which for climate policy, for example, could justify a “wait and see” approach. Some 
51 
52 advocate declining or hyperbolic discount rates (Kirby, 1997), others a low constant rate. Heal 
53 
54 and Millner (2014) argue that there are no objectively correct discount rates, just different 
55 ethical positions that need to be weighted: climate policy analysis “becomes an exercise in 
57 social choice” that requires aggregating “the diverse preferences of individuals into a 
58 
59 representative discount rate”. At any rate, CBA should consider the impact of the discount 
1 
2 
3 rate on the analysis, including sensitivity analysis using different discount rates and explicit 
4 
5 discussion of impacts in different time periods (HMT, 2018)12 
6 
7 
8 Valuation is sometimes attempted for whole systems (e.g. WTP to protect a specific 
9 natural area). In general however an attempt is first made to quantify environmental impacts 
11 as changes in physical values (such as tonnes of carbon storage, crop production, flood risks) 
12 
13 and then to ascribe an economic value for each physical unit. There is also an important 
14 
15 distinction between stocks of ‘assets’ (e.g. total carbon stored) and flows of goods and 
16 services (e.g. carbon sequestered per year) (Ozdemiroglu, 2019). 
18 
19 Extensive official guidance for appraisal exists in many jurisdictions, including the 
20 
21 UK (HMT, 2018), the EU (EC, 2015), US (EPA, 2010) and so on. Guidance for value transfer 
22 
23 is also available (e.g. eftec, 2010 as formal guidance from UK Defra). 
24 
25 
26 Although valuation is primarily used in public sector settings, there is increasing 
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33 
40 
59 
27 uptake in the private sector for determining customer priorities, (investment) option design 
28 
29 and appraisal, communication and performance tracking purposes, including natural capital 
30 
31 and ecosystem accounting.  Initiatives include, for example, The Natural Capital Project13, the 
32 World Business Council on Sustainable Development14, and the Natural Capital Coalition15 at 
34 the international level, and water company business planning in the UK. Wales (2014), Bowe 
35 
36 and van der Horst (2015), and Dickie et al., (this issue) and Koshy et al., (this issue) give 
37 
38 examples of how and why private organisations use economic valuation for natural capital 
39 accounting. 
41 
42 
5 Critiques of valuation 
43 
44 
45 Using market values to account for goods and services traded in markets, including ecosystem 
46 
47 goods (food, timber etc.), is relatively uncontroversial. But use of economic values for non- 
48 
49    
50 
51 12 The 2018 version of the HM Treasury Green Book introduces a ‘health discount rate’ starting at 1.5% and 
52 
53 declining over time (compared to social discount rate starting at 3.5%). The difference is due to the exclusion of 
54 ‘wealth effect’, or real per capita consumption growth element of the discount rate when discounting health 
55 
56 effects (HMT, 2018, p 103). 
57 13 www.naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu 
58 14 www.wbcsd.org 
60 15 www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org 
1 
2 
3 marketed services such as clean air provision or biodiversity protection has been criticised on 
4 
5 many fronts (Table 2). 
6 
7 
8 Table 2: Valuation assumptions, problems and resolutions 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Assumption Problem? Generalisation Resolution? 
Individuals’ 
preferences strongly 
correlated with 
welfare 
Sometimes false (e.g. 
drug addiction), often 
dubious (e.g. myopic 
preferences and regret: 
Hoch and 
Loewenstein, 1991). 
Democratic societies 
allow wide freedom of 
choice under rules to 
curb excesses, 
encourage saving etc. 
Recognise TEV 
focuses on 
individual 
preference, 
consider other 
moral decision 
rules in 
deliberative 
processes. 
Individuals have 
information and 
ability to have stable, 
well-formed 
People have “bounded 
rationality” (March 
and Simon, 1958), 
construct preferences 
Affects other 
methods. Market 
institutions consistent 
with assumptions, 
Cognitive limits 
may support 
procedural 
rationality (Laville, 
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28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27
28 
 desirable/fair partly reflect 
democratic processes. 
 
Smooth, continuous 
value functions 
Non-linearities, 
threshold effects and 
areas of highly 
inelastic demand / 
rapidly changing 
values 
Small-scale, marginal 
assessments less 
likely to suffer than 
large-scale, major 
changes. 
Valuation less 
useful for critical 
natural capital or 
potentially 
catastrophic 
changes. 
Data gaps in scientific 
understanding and 
valuation evidence 
No valuation or 
appraisal can be 
complete and accurate 
Applies to all 
methods: use range of 
values, sensitivity 
analysis, clear 
statements of gaps. 
Valuation/appraisal 
are aids to 
deliberation, not 
“the answer”. 
Optimism bias: 
tendency to 
underestimate future 
costs and 
overestimate benefits 
CBA likely to be 
biased (see Mackie 
and Preston, 1998). 
More about physical 
outcomes and timings 
than valuation 
methods. 
Recognise and 
adjust for optimism 
(or ‘pessimism’) 
bias. 
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Valuation assumes full knowledge about the ways changes in environmental goods 
37 and services influence utility functions. But these linkages are often complex and poorly 
38 
39 understood (Cardinale et al., 2012). There are many sources of complexity, variability, and 
40 
41 uncertainty, in bio-physical systems and in human preferences and technologies, resulting in 
42 accumulating uncertainty throughout stages of valuation. Furthermore, any ecosystem is 
44 related to other ecosystems and human/economic systems in complex ways. There may be 
45 
46 delays, threshold effects, and different impacts at various spatial and temporal scales 
47 
48 (Muradian, 2001, Kremen, 2005, Groffman et al., 2006). Furthermore, individuals are not 
49 risk-neutral regarding environmental outcomes, so recognising, communicating and treating 
51 uncertainty can lead to significantly different results in valuation studies (Faccioli et al., 
52 
53 2018). In terms of using values in decision support, Boithias et al., (2016) identify key 
54 uncertainties associated with the number of services considered, the benefits considered for 
56 each service, the valuation metrics, and the parameters included in them. The common 
57 
58 practice of focusing on expected values can also be also problematic, especially where ‘fat 
1 
2 
3 tails’ of low-probability but highly damaging outcomes should motivate precautionary 
4 
5 policies (Taleb, 2014, Weitzman, 2009). 
6 
7 
8 Coverage is limited to the estimated part of total economic value, omitting other 
9 sources of value. Critical elements of the natural environment may be overlooked in decision 
11 processes if they are not recognised as important, due to incompleteness of the evidence base 
12 
13 linking environmental features to valuable services. For example, we often underestimate the 
14 
15 value of biodiversity and ecosystems by failing to account for the ways they support provision 
16 of food and water, and provide natural insurance to adapt to future conditions and shocks. 
18 
19 Accumulating uncertainties reduce reliability of value estimates. Even for known 
20 
21 impacts and resultant wellbeing changes, data may only exist in one location for one change 
22 
23 context, and the transfer of this evidence to other contexts adds uncertainty depending on the 
24 similarities between the contexts. Primary research can help, but it is not always practical to 
26 wait until scientific uncertainty is resolved. In most cases, it is necessary to take decisions 
27 
28 under uncertainty, making best use of the information available. For example, cost-benefit 
29 
30 results should be tested for sensitivity to assumptions used, and any risks, uncertainties, 
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31 missing data, and other caveats must be clearly and fully reported. 
32 
33 
34 Aggregating individual preferences to produce a well-characterised social preference 
35 
36 ordering leads to tractable social value functions, with obvious practical advantages for 
37 
38 decision support; the neoclassical approach dominates welfare economics both in theory and 
39 in practice. However, expected utility theory does not always provide a reliable guide to 
41 individual human behaviour, and the derived social orderings may not accord with actual 
42 
43 social preferences. 
44 
45 
46 Evidence from economics and psychology has raised questions about the rationality of 
47 actual decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Thaler, 2015), identifying situations in which 
49 expected utility theory fails to explain people’s behaviour. Framing effects and preference 
50 
51 reversals arise in quite simple settings and people consistently put more weight on potential 
52 
53 losses than on gains (Allais, 1953, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, Kahneman and Tversky, 
54 1979). For complex decisions, deviations from the expected utility theory are widespread (see 
56 e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Valuation methods presuppose that choice-makers are fully 
57 
58 aware of how alternative choices would influence their welfare. However, information and 
59 calculation requirements for ‘rational choice’ may be extensive, especially in environmental 
1 
2 
3 contexts where links from environmental change to human welfare are poorly understood, 
4 
5 even by experts. In some situations, individual preferences may be vague or simply ‘wrong’ 
6 in respect of welfare impacts. For such ‘wicked’ problems, economic valuation estimates 
8 
may be skewed, and cost-benefit analyses may not be a good guide to the relative desirability 
9 
10 of outcomes. 
11 
12 
13 This might not matter if on average economic systems operate “as if” economic agents 
14 
15 were rational utility maximizers (Friedman, 1953). However, models built assuming such 
16 agents underplay or ignore human interactions, cognitive limitations, and biases and do not 
18 reliably predict the evolution of economies (Colander et al., 2009). Furthermore, even with 
19 
20 the “as if” assumption, treating aggregate TEV as an index of social welfare involves two 
21 further assumptions: inter-personal comparability of utility (to aggregate preferences) and that 
23 underlying income distributions are socially acceptable. 
24 
25 
26 These assumptions may be an acceptable approximation in market exchanges: our 
27 
28 economic structures use these values, and tax/welfare policies redistribute incomes following 
29 
30 democratic processes. However, extending valuation and market framings to areas where 
31 market mechanisms and property rights have not been defined is ethically contentious and 
32 
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33 may have unintended consequences (Vatn, 2000; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010, Sullivan, 2013). 
34 
35 ‘Crowding out’ of non-market motives and values does occur where policy instruments 
36 introduce economic incentives and as a result modify people’s motivational structures (Rode 
38 et al., 2015). Environmental taxes also tend to represent a greater proportion of income for 
39 
40 poorer groups, however these could be compensated by changes to other distortionary, 
41 
42 regressive taxes (e.g. VAT, labour taxes). 
43 
44 
The use of monetary valuation in appraisal is a matter of framing benefits in a certain 
46 
way, rather than any change in incentive structures, and so may be less likely to lead to 
47 
48 crowding out of other arguments and motivations in deliberation (Tinch et al., 2018). 
49 
50 Nevertheless, it can appear more ‘efficient’ to cluster environmental ‘bads’ where people are 
51 poorer, because their WTP (constrained by income) is lower. Valuation and appraisal can be 
53 adjusted via income weighting (rare) and/or use of average (mean or median) WTP values for 
54 
55 whole populations (common), but full accounting for distributional impacts is rare and more 
56 
57 attention might be given to this area. 
58 
1 
2 
3 The neoclassical approach allows individual preferences and WTP to reflect other- 
4 
5 regarding values and moral norms, notably through non-use values. Using these values for 
6 social choice assumes that “the ecological, social and cultural dimensions of value can be both 
8 compared and compensated fully and justly” (Kenter et al., 2015) and that contentious issues 
9 
10 regarding inter- and intra-generational equity are adequately resolved via assumptions about 
11 
12 discounting and treatment of income distribution. Furthermore, if individuals have context- 
13 specific values/preferences – values used in market exchange settings may be quite different 
15 from values used in group deliberation or public choice – the methods cannot give a single 
16 
17 consistent ranking of policy alternatives (Kenter et al., 2015; Parks and Gowdy, 2013). 
18 
19 However, this applies to all approaches, not just valuation
16. 
20 
21 
The value of a good or service can vary with its quantity and quality and hence most 
23 values represent a marginal value in a particular context. For many environmental services, 
24 
25 demand can be quite ‘elastic’ at high levels of provision, but inelastic for lower levels, and 
26 
27 effectively ‘infinite’ for essential services or ‘critical natural capital’ (see Chiesura and De 
28 Groot, 2003). This puts limits on the appropriateness of valuation, with valuation relatively 
30 unproblematic under elastic demand, less reliable under inelastic demand, and not appropriate 
31 
32 for critical capital. 
33 
34 
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35 Economists recognize these issues but use TEV and CBA for practical reasons: many 
36 of the objections can be adjusted for to some extent, and no approach is perfect. A critical 
38 question is whether or not the evidence is actually useful, and this will depend on the 
39 
40 deliberation and decision-making processes and the individuals involved. Flyvbjerg (2009) 
41 
42 argues that errors in forecasting are so substantial that CBA will almost always be “strongly 
43 misleading,” summarising this as “Garbage in, garbage out”. Conversely, Asplund and 
45 Eliasson (2016) conclude that, despite pervasive uncertainties, CBA “is able to fairly 
46 
47 consistently separate the wheat from the chaff and hence contribute to substantially improved 
48 infrastructure decisions.” eftec (2010b) reviewed the CBA of conservation projects, finding 
50 
that, while there are few clear examples of “near-perfect” CBA studies, there are several 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 16 Arrow's impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1950) proves that for any method of aggregating individual 
58 preferences, individual preference patterns can exist such that it is impossible to derive a social ranking that 
60 meets minimal conditions of consistency, non-dictatorship, universality, monotonicity, and independence. 
1 
2 
3 examples that are “good enough” to provide a useful aid to decision making within a given 
4 
5 context. 
6 
7 
8 Other techniques exist that elicit different expressions of social preferences, including 
9 deliberative monetary valuation, ranking, participatory multi-criteria analysis, citizen juries, 
11 in-depth discussion groups, participatory modelling and mapping, and so on. These alternative 
12 
13 decision support and/or valuation methods do not resolve all the concerns identified for 
14 
15 valuation and CBA, and may introduce new ones, but can be useful in allowing different 
16 perspectives on social choice.  Alternative decision rules may for example prioritise 
18 precaution and robustness over maximisation of expected values. In many cases these 
19 
20 methods can be complementary to valuation and CBA, with evidence from several methods 
21 being incorporated within a wider deliberative process. 
23 
24 
It is widely recognised by economists (see e.g. TEEB, 2010, Diaz et al., 2018) that 
26 monetary valuation and cost benefit analysis only provide one form of evidence to support 
27 
28 decision making, and should be used as a complement to ethical and scientific analyses and 
29 
30 consideration of various opinions relating to environmental exploitation and conservation. 
31 Monetary valuation, and decision support using it, should never be treated as the ‘right’ 
32 
33 answer, nor as an alternative to deliberation. Rather, valuation is a support to thinking within 
34 
35 decision-making processes, and a way of summarising certain forms of information in a 
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36 convenient and tractable fashion. Of course there remains a risk of results being misused – for 
38 example being “cherry-picked” to support pre-determined conclusions – but this problem is 
39 
40 hardly unique to valuation. 
41 
42 
43 6 Barriers and prospects for economic valuation 
44 
45 
46 Use of economic valuation to support decisions remains piecemeal. Some argue that there are 
47 few clear examples of economic valuation having an influence (Laurans et al., 2013) and that 
49 ecosystem service information has yet to fundamentally change decision-making (Guerry et 
50 
51 al., 2015, Ruckelshaus et al., 2015). On the other hand the growing evidence base does 
52 
53 appear to be encouraging policy responses (for example the UK 2011 White Paper “The 
54 natural choice: securing the value of nature” response to the National Ecosystem Assessment, 
56 and the European Commission’s Biodiversity Strategy commitments and related investments 
57 
58 in the “Mapping and Assessment of Ecosystems and their Services” (MAES) initiative). 
59 Furthermore, valuation is only one aspect in a complex process and decision makers may have 
1 
2 
3 motives beyond the issues covered by valuation (Atkinson, 2015). This can even make policy 
4 
5 makers reluctant to use CBA at policy formation stages, since the results might not support 
6 their favoured policies (Pearce, 1998), with formal tools coming into play only later via 
8 
mandatory appraisals. Similarly, Mackie et al., (2014) argue that CBA often enters the 
9 
10 planning process too late to play any meaningful role. This is particularly the case where 
11 
12 planning processes are centred around a perceived “problem”: where the problem is seen as 
13 central and significant, even inefficient solutions may be viewed as “better than nothing”. 
15 
16 
This situation reflects a number of barriers to take-up of economic valuation for 
18 decision making. Decision makers may focus on short-term more than long-term impacts, 
19 
20 and may resist non-market valuation because it is perceived as less reliable than estimates of 
21 project costs (Barton, 2007) or market benefits. Formal appraisal tools (mostly CBA) are 
23 widely used, but often focus on direct costs to industry (Nilsson et al 2008). Although 
24 
25 decision makers are increasingly aware of non-market costs and benefits, they often lack 
26 
27 expertise or support needed to apply values in appraisals. Official guidelines such as the UK 
28 public sector “Green Book” (HMT, 2018 and supporting documents) help address this, though 
30 many countries lack guidelines. But even in the impact assessments of the UK Government, 
31 
32 quantification and monetisation of ecosystem services remain rare: while carbon emissions 
33 
34 and air pollution are commonly valued (following clear guidance), changes in the ecosystem 
35 services of climate regulation or air pollution regulation are less commonly reported or valued 
36 
37 (eftec and Cascade, 2014). There is, as yet, no standardised approach for the private sector – 
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38 
39 although this is changing, for example via the Natural Capital Committee publications 
40 (including the ‘how to’ guide)17, United Nations System of Environmental Economic 
42 Accounting (UN SEEA) guidelines18 and the Natural Capital Protocol19. Although there 
43 
44 remain gaps in the valuation evidence base, these are gradually being filled, and valuation 
45 
46 databases such as EVRI and TEEB contain thousands of studies.20 
47 
48 
As the number and impact of economic and environmental trade-offs are expected to 
50 
grow, it is reasonable to expect continued theoretical development and application of robust 
51 
52    
53 
54 17
 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/natural-capital-committee 
55 
56 
18
 https://seea.un.org/ 
57 
19
 https://naturalcapitalcoalition.org/ 
58 
20
 www.evri.ca; https://www.es-partnership.org/services/data-knowledge-sharing/ecosystem-service-valuation- 
60 database/ 
1 
2 
3 and varied economic valuation technique in an increasingly diverse set of situations, as part of 
4 
5 a broader policy analysis and decision support system (Turner, 2007). Wider use of economic 
6 valuation is occurring as a product of efforts to “mainstream” environmental concerns across 
8 
all sectors. Researchers have recognised the challenges of communicating environmental 
9 
10 priorities to policy makers in sectors that depend on and/or influence ecosystems, especially 
11 
12 in the face of political agendas and private interests that have prioritised short-term growth 
13 and employment over longer-term concerns. They have responded with initiatives aiming to 
15 help ensure that environmental concerns are taken into account alongside economic and social 
16 
17 priorities, including increasing use of economic valuation concepts in a wide range of policies 
18 
19 and research initiatives at both national and international levels. For example, economic 
20 analysis was explicitly included in the EU Water Framework Directive (see eftec, 2010c). The 
22 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Aichi Targets and the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 
23 
24 2020 (EUBS) both include targets and actions relating specifically to mainstreaming 
25 biodiversity values across government and society, promoting awareness of the economic 
27 values of biodiversity and ecosystems, and incorporating these values in accounting and 
28 
29 reporting systems.21 
30 
31 
32 Meanwhile, work has advanced on natural capital accounting, in particular through the 
33 
34 United Nations Statistics Division, the European Environment Agency and the World Bank 
35 Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES)
22 global partnership. The 
36 
37 UN SEEA uses concepts, definitions and classifications consistent with the System of 
38 
39 National Accounts (SNA) to facilitate integration of environmental and economic statistics, 
40 and is an international standard23. Full ecosystem accounting, including most accounting for 
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37 
42 biodiversity, comes under the SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounts, which is not (yet) a 
43 
44 standard and is at the stage of further development and testing, e.g. in Europe (Weber, 2011) 
45 
46 and the UK (ONS, 2018). Further moves to mainstreaming valuation are evident in the 
47 development of ISO 14007 and 14008 as noted above. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 21 Aichi targets 1 and 2, EUBS action 5. 
58 22 http://www.wavespartnership.org/en 
60 23 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp 
1 
2 
3 7 Conclusion 
4 
5 
6 Monetary arguments for recognising the relative importance of different forms of natural 
7 
8 capital and processes may not be to everyone’s taste, but this framing can be useful and 
9 convincing for some decision makers. For others, initial mistrust of unfamiliar methods can 
11 give way to active demand for monetary evidence (e.g. Mathieu et al., 2016). Some reject 
12 
13 monetary valuation “on principle” (e.g. McCauley, 2006), but, as Mace (2014) argues, “if the 
14 
15 benefits provided by nature are assigned no value, they are treated as having no value, and 
16 current trends in the decline and deterioration of natural systems will continue.” In her 
18 proposed “people and nature” framing for conservation, there is space for economic and 
19 
20 monetary arguments alongside considerations of resilience, adaptability and the complex 
21 interdependencies of human and natural systems. 
23 
24 
This flexibility can be central to keeping environmental issues in the mainstream of 
26 decision processes. For example, at the European level, the priority accorded to economic 
27 
28 growth and employment under the Lisbon Strategy, coupled with the perception that 
29 
30 environmental concerns are in opposition to growth, jobs and competitiveness, has created a 
31 serious challenge for environmental protection. In response, there has been growing emphasis 
32 
33 on concepts such as the Circular Economy, Green Economy, green infrastructure, natural 
34 
35 capital, and nature-based solutions, and a corresponding shift in language and arguments for 
36 environmental protection, with greater use of economic and monetary arguments for raising 
38 awareness and tracking performance (Tinch et al., 2015). At the launch of the 2020 
39 
40 biodiversity strategy, the European Parliament rapporteur stated ‘each year we lose 3% of 
41 
42 GDP due to the loss of biodiversity. That costs the EUR 450 billion year after year. 
 Page 26 of 45 
26 
 
 
 
44 
52 
59 
7 
14 
43 Compared to these figures, investing EUR 5.8 billion per year in Natura 2000 is a bargain!’24 
45 
46 
Monetary valuation is not essential: there are alternative ways of carrying out 
47 
48 appraisal (Multi criteria analysis, collective decision and other forms of deliberation 
49 
50 methods), and even market-based instruments could be implemented without valuation. 
51 However, valuation can contribute to improving decisions, helping ensure that environmental 
53 concerns are taken fully into account on a “level playing field” with economic and social 
54 
55 concerns, even in sectors not primarily focused on conservation. 
56    
57 
58 
24 Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE, NL). See 
60 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/2020.htm 
1 
2 
3 Valuation is not a replacement for deliberation, but rather part of it, offering a particular 
4 
5 way of examining the efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative uses of resources, 
6 and making deliberative processes easier, more efficient, and more transparent and replicable. 
8 
In this light, it is encouraging to note the ongoing development of improved valuation 
9 
10 methods and a richer evidence base, alongside growing private and public sector interest in 
11 
12 incorporating natural capital and environmental flows in project appraisal and accounting 
13 processes. 
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